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Abstract The literature on territorial lobbying in the European Union (EU) has paid
much attention to the interaction between regional representations in Brussels and the
member-state central governments, and the relations of these representations with the Eur-
opean institutions. Surprisingly, far less systematic research has been conducted on the
policies that regional representations prioritize when they lobby in Brussels. In this article,
we focus on the policy portfolios of these organizations and analyze variation concerning the
domains and issues these regional representations prioritize. Empirically, we demonstrate
that the size and the nature of a policy portfolio is not primarily affected by the capabilities of
a regional representation, but rather results from structural ties of regional lobbyists with
other public and private interests. This claim is corroborated by data collected through a
telephone survey with 127 officials from regional offices and trans-regional associations.
Interest Groups & Advocacy (2014) 3, 79–98. doi:10.1057/iga.2013.15
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Regional authorities, that is sub-state jurisdictions such as provinces, counties,
regions and länder, mobilize in large numbers in the European Union (EU), often
by establishing a permanent representation in Brussels (Donas and Beyers, 2013a).
Following Swenden et al (2006, p. 864) we denote these actors as regions, which
are meso-level jurisdictions situated between local units of government (such as
municipalities) and the central government. The Brussels-based representations
of these entities act as communication channels between the region and the European
institutions. They monitor policy developments in Brussels, functioning as a kind of
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‘early warning systems’ for regional governments, while they also sometimes take
a pro-active stance, for instance by supplying key expertise to the European
Commission. Hence, their activities are highly similar to those of interest organiza-
tions representing firms or citizens. Regional offices also act as intermediaries
between regionally based constituencies (for example companies, NGOs, local and
subnational governments) and the European institutions. These regional representa-
tions have a potentially large and diverse number of policy interests, as they aim to
represent territorial interests of both a public and private nature. Similar to other
interest organizations, however, they also face a ‘bottleneck of attention’, implying
that ‘only one or a very few things can be attended to simultaneously’ (Simon, 1985,
p. 302). Political organizations might have interests in various policy domains, and
a large number of issues situated within these domains might be of concern to them.
As a result of finite resources and the limited amount of information that can be
processed by one single organization, however, organizations cannot get involved in
every matter that is of possible interest to them. Therefore, one important question
involves which policy domains and issues regional representations prioritize.
How organized interests determine their policy portfolio has scarcely been studied
(exceptions include Heaney, 2004; Strolovitch, 2007). We define a policy portfolio
as the set of domains and policy issues an organized interest prioritizes in its political
activities.1 The lack of research attention for an organization’s policy portfolio also
applies to research on regional representations in the EU. Various studies have
examined the activities of regional offices in Brussels highlighting the differences
in their strategies, for instance the extent to which they liaise with civil society
actors (Jeffrey, 1997; Marks et al, 2002; Huyssuenne and Jans, 2008; Rowe, 2011).
However, the policy portfolio is equally relevant, as it provides a cue about what
an organization stands for. Its size and nature has an important signaling function
towards an organization’s environment, such as political elites, constituencies and
other organized interests. For instance, it indicates whether an organized interest has
a rather encompassing or more specialized orientation. Another important question
in this regard is whether organized interests are mostly active on distributive or
regulatory policies, as these two types involve a different set of private interests and
are characterized by distinct political dynamics.
One could argue that the size and nature of a policy portfolio largely reflects
the resources of an interest organization and the political-institutional context within
which it operates. For instance, an organization with more financial means would
have a larger and more diverse portfolio. Or, an organization that depends on public
grants and subsidies would have a more on re-distributive portfolio. Nonetheless,
we argue that the policy portfolio of an interest organization is structurally affected
by its network embeddedness, namely how the organization is connected to other
actors in its environment. This is particularly the case for regional offices, which are
agencies established by regional governments in order to represent regional interests
in Brussels. As most of these representations have limited resources, they tend to
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cooperate with other regional offices, yet also with private interests. In many
instances, regional offices adopt the role of a transmission belt between regional
constituencies (encompassing subnational governments, business and societal inter-
ests) and the European institutions (Greenwood, 2011). Our overall expectation is that
networks with various public and private actors will affect a regional representation’s
policy portfolio. This article aims to explain how the size and the nature of portfolios
vary across different regional representations, by next to resources and political-
institutional features also taking into account their network embeddedness.
The first section of this article explains why we conceptualize the activities of
regional offices at the EU level as equivalent to those of other organized interests.
Next, we clarify the concept of an organization’s portfolio by addressing its different
analytical dimensions and formulate research hypotheses explaining its size and the
nature. In the third part, we present our research design and dataset, which relies
on evidence collected through a telephone survey with 127 regional officials based
in Brussels. Finally, we empirically analyze the policy portfolios of regional
representations and discuss our most important results. Our findings suggest that the
size and nature of a policy portfolio is not primarily affected by the mobilized
resources or capabilities, but rather follows from how regional lobbyists are connec-
ted to other public and private actors.
A Lobbying Perspective on the Policy Portfolio of Regional
Representations
In this article, we conceptualize regional offices – that is representatives of sub-
national governments – as equivalent to organized interests. In the following
paragraphs, we argue why we consider this perspective appropriate and clarify how
such a perspective can contribute to our understanding of the policy portfolio
regional representations develop.
At this moment, more than 400 territorial interest organizations are active in
Brussels (Donas and Beyers, 2013a). They represent a wide variety of sub-state
jurisdictions, such as regions, provinces and cities. In addition to the regional offices
analyzed in this article, these territorial interests also include associations of all
regions in one member-state (that establish a single representation for the entire
subnational tier of this country) and associations that consist of regions from different
member-states, or so-called trans-regional associations. These regional representa-
tion sometimes engage in state-like practices, for instance when they rely on a liaison
office that functions as an unofficial embassy. Yet, the fact that they often act col-
lectively, for example when they establish a trans-regional association with other
offices, makes them rather similar to interest organizations. In this regard, it is no
surprise that some previous studies on the relations between regional authorities and
the EU relied strongly on interest group literature (for instance Marks et al, 1996,
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2002). Still, although territorial interests and local governments are regularly
mentioned in reviews of the EU interest population (Greenwood, 2003), or referred
to in broader studies on organized interests (Salisbury, 1983; Gray and Lowery,
1996), especially in the European literature they rarely are a key unit of analysis in
interest group studies (exceptions from the US scene include Cammisa, 1995;
Haider, 1974; Marbach and Leckrone, 2002).
One could question the applicability of the interest group concept in this partic-
ular field. Indeed, some regional authorities obtained formal access to EU policy-
making processes through institutional channels such as the Committee of the
Regions (CoR) and the Council of Ministers (more precisely on the basis of arti-
cle 203 of the Amsterdam Treaty; see Hooghe, 1995, p. 180; Hooghe and Marks,
1996; Tatham, 2008). Yet, such formal access points are not inconsistent with a con-
ceptualization of these actors as organized interests. That is, a limited number of
functional interests are also granted formal access. For example, labor unions
and business organizations are still qualified as interest groups, notwithstanding
their degree of ‘institutionalization’ through the European Economic and Social
Committee or the European Social Dialogue (Coen and Richardson, 2009).
Furthermore, it is questionable whether an inclusion in the CoR or the Council
enlarges the influence of regional interests. Access to the Council is available to only
a very small number of regions, and even if such access is granted, regional officials
are expected to represent the position of their member-state as a whole (for this
reason, some scholars qualified access to the Council as being merely symbolic; see
Hooghe, 1995, p. 180). Likewise, the CoR offers few powers to regional authorities,
as it has only an advisory function. Again, central state governments play a vital role,
as it is usually the prerogative of the central government to assign the members of the
CoR. All in all, similar to traditional Brussels-based interest groups, regional
authorities lack a strong formal position, and therefore frequently engage in activities
that resemble the practices of interests groups. By establishing lobby-networks,
cooperating with other regional interests and allying with private interests, these
regional offices aim to strengthen their role and position in the EU policymaking
processes.
One of the reasons for studying the substantive nature of policy portfolios is that
this helps us to highlight the representative character of regional offices. A closer
look at what sort of topics are prioritized gives us a sense of the extent to which the
lobbying activities of a regional office are inspired by other public and private actors
(see also Halpin and Nownes, 2013). In order to establish its policy portfolio – the
overall set of issues and domains an organized interest invests resources in – interest
group officials need to translate their broad mission – in casu the representation
of their regional constituency – into specific political efforts. This process of policy
prioritization by individual organizations is a crucial but often overlooked ingre-
dient of the policy process. Still, most exchanges with policymakers revolve around
issue-related expertise and information exchanged during such encounters affects
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policymakers’ understanding of a particular policy matter. As organized interest
works on various topics with varying degrees of intensity, the nature and the size of
policy portfolios can be quite diverse (Strolovitch, 2007). Whereas the broad mission
of different organized interests might be quite similar or even identical, how
organizations translate their general orientation into political action can vary
considerably (Fraussen, 2013). All Brussels-based regional representations fulfill
a similar function and gain their legitimacy from defending regional interests.
Nonetheless, as has been demonstrated in several case studies, their policy objectives
can be highly different (Jeffrey, 1997; Moore, 2006; Greenwood, 2011; Rowe, 2011).
Moreover, such differences are not only a matter of variation across member-states.
For example, Criekemans showed that the priorities of the Belgian regions – Flanders
and Wallonia – varied considerably (Criekemans, 2010). The Flemish government
considers EU regulatory policies as a key component of its EU policy and its
representation in Brussels is generally active on a wide range of regulatory and re-
distributive policy topics. Although the Walloon Region enjoys identical political
competencies, its regional representation has a much more specialized policy portfolio
as it mainly focuses on re-distributive policies, such as the Interreg program.
To clarify the varying nature and size of policy portfolios, we explicitly take into
account the overall context in which these regional offices are embedded and
acknowledge their dependence on other organizational entities. Our starting point
thereby is social network and exchange theory, which presumes that dependencies
between actors strongly shape their behavioral practices (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
These dependencies and networks are expected to affect the perceptions, beliefs
and actions of organized interests. They may for instance promote shared under-
standings and affect policy portfolio development. As Strolovitch extensively
demonstrates in her work on affirmative advocacy:
there is no objectively determined set of issues that are central to a group’s
mission or niche. Rather, it is (…) perceptions about and constructions of their
missions and niches that are key, perceptions and constructions that are
influenced a great deal by the same factors that suppress levels of activity on
some issues while boosting activities on other issues. (2007, p. 108)
The social context, in particular the interaction between regional offices and
other stakeholders, is thus highly relevant for the construction of policy portfolios.
First, regional offices operate in a crowded environment in which numerous other
interests – businesses, labor unions, research organizations and NGOs – are active.
This implies that they face competition from other interests in seeking attention from
EU policymakers. On the other hand, some of these organized interests can also
become providers of useful information, or even allies. Second, while regional
offices formally represent regional governments, in many cases they might also act as
intermediaries for private interests such as companies, local governments or civil
society organizations. In this way, the regional office acts as a transmission belt that
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not only represents the regional executive stricto senso, but also functions as a
spokesperson for a large number of societal interests that are located in the region. In
some cases regional offices could be allies of particular economic and functional
interests that are strongly tied to a region, such as harbors, airports, research institutes
or specific industries. The support of a democratically elected government and its
Brussels-based representation might be valuable for these parties, as it increases the
political credibility and legitimacy of their claims.
We distinguish two dimensions in the policy portfolios of a regional representa-
tion. On the one hand we have the size of the portfolio, which relates to the number of
policy domains or issues, covered by a regional representation. Interest group
communities usually encompass a large number of rather specialized organizations
and a small, but often well-resourced, set of more generalist associations (Browne,
1990; Heaney, 2004; Soule and King, 2008; Halpin and Binderkrantz, 2009; Halpin
and Thomas III, 2011). We expect a similar pattern for the Brussels-based
community of regional offices; some of these offices will have a very specialized
portfolio, whereas others cover broad interests that are not confined to one particular
sector. On the other hand, we have the re-distributive and/or regulatory nature of the
portfolio. Following Lowi (1972), re-distributive and regulatory issues are expected
to involve a different set of private interests and exhibit distinct political dynamics.
Generally, we expect that regional offices will be very active on re-distributive
matters, such as the allocation of structural funds or the development of trans-
European transportation links, which directly affect regional public budgets and
provide regional political elites with additional policy opportunities. This makes that
the stakes in such dossiers are very high. Regarding regulatory issues – for instance
safety regulations for chemical or food products – private interests (such as business,
labor or consumer groups) often are directly affected, and therefore will demonstrate
a high level of activity. We expect that the exchanges these private interests have
with regional offices on these topics may considerably shape the latter’s portfolio. In
general, while re-distributive issues mostly allocate European budgetary resources
directly to the regional government, the impact of regulatory issues often targets
a more narrow constituency of a region, for instance a specific economic sector or
a particular industry.
Research Hypotheses
This section presents our hypotheses concerning the size and nature of policy
portfolios. Do resources and political-institutional factors largely determine the
portfolios of regional offices? Or are these portfolios primarily shaped by input from
other actors with whom the office frequently interacts? The information and expertise
provided by various regional businesses, farmers’ associations, consumer groups,
transport sector or environmental NGOs can be highly relevant for regional offices.
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Moreover, within a regional executive, or its Brussels’ representation, different (and
sometimes incompatible) views can exist regarding the domains or issues that need to
be prioritized (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). As a result, establishing a policy
portfolio that satisfies an entire constituency, frequently represents quite a challenge
(Schmitter and Streeck, 1999 [1982], p. 15). Often, organizational objectives are
presented in a very broad way, relating to the general interest of a region (for
instance, economic development and prosperity), while the policy portfolio – that is
the set of domains and issues in which organizational resources are invested – is
geared to a particular subset of that constituency (for example regulatory matters of
concern to particular businesses) (Moe, 1980; Salisbury, 1983; Strolovitch, 2007).
To account for the varying size and nature of policy portfolios, we first consider
the resources of a regional representation. It is generally hypothesized that more
resources lead to an expansion of the breadth of policy engagement (Halpin and
Binderkrantz, 2009). Therefore, we expect that resourceful representations are more
likely to invest in many domains and policy issues (Marks et al, 1996; Nielsen and
Salk, 1998). However, this effect will be particularly strong for policy domains and
issues of a regulatory nature. Owing to their more specialized and technical nature,
these issues are considered more demanding in terms of time investments and
(human and financial) resources. In short:
Hypothesis 1: The more resources a regional office mobilizes, the larger the size of
its regulatory policy portfolio.
Next we test for two key political-institutional features of the context in which
regional representations operate. Regions with many policy responsibilities need
more information on EU policies, as they are to a greater extent affected by EU
policies that need to be transposed and implemented. These highly autonomous
regions are therefore expected to have a larger regulatory policy portfolio (Marks
et al, 1996). In addition, regions that acquire substantial EU-funding will try to
preserve the acquired financial resources. It seems likely that officials representing
such regions will strongly focus on these re-distributive policies. In short, our two
hypotheses taking into account the political-institutional context are as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The more a region enjoys higher levels of self-rule, the larger the
size of the regulatory policy portfolio of its Brussels-based regional
representation.
Hypothesis 3: The more EU-funding a region receives, the larger the size of the
re-distributive policy portfolio of its Brussels-based regional
representation.
Our third set of hypotheses relates to an organization’s network embeddedness. As
we assume that ties to other stakeholders are critical to explaining the policy portfolio
of regional representations, we specifically consider whether Brussels’ offices establish
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networks with other regional offices, or public and private actors at different levels
of government. In earlier work, we demonstrated that regional offices are formally
and informally connected to each other, through, respectively, their membership of
trans-regional associations (Donas and Beyers, 2013a) and exchanges with other
Brussels offices (Donas and Beyers, 2013b). Furthermore, for their political activities,
regional representations rely on input from other actors, such as their subnational
constituency and governmental actors at different levels, yet also EU-level public and
private interests (see also Rowe, 2011). This also reflects one of the rationales behind
establishing a Brussels representation, namely enabling regional authorities to monitor
the policy environment and establish networks with other stakeholders.
We expect that the size of the re-distributive and regulatory policy portfolio will
be affected by these contextual factors. As re-distributive matters largely depend on
intergovernmental bargaining in the Council of Ministers, we expect that actors who
seek influence on such policies will strongly rely on relations with other domestic –
national and regional – policymakers. As a result, extensive ties with other domestic
policymakers – for instance officials of other regional offices – should predict the size
of the re-distributive policy portfolio. In order to influence these issues, a regional
office requires information to woo its national Permanent Representation, while also
close cooperation with other regions from its country may be helpful. As a result, we
expect that regional representations that are more active on re-distributive matters will
mostly interact with regional offices from their own country;
Hypothesis 4: Regional offices that have most of their information exchanges
with other regional offices from their own country, have a larger
re-distributive policy portfolio.
In addition to domestic networks, regional authorities can also aim to obtain their
policy objectives through trans-regional associations (Donas and Beyers, 2013a).
In this regard, two outcomes seem possible. These networks could function as
a substitute for some of the lobbying activities of the office, thus resulting in a smaller
policy portfolio for the regional office. On the other hand, such formal networks also
provide relevant knowledge to regional representations, and in this way possibly
expand their portfolio. Some earlier work has shown that the majority of these
associations focus on matters of a distributive nature, such as ‘community develop-
ment’ in geographically connected regions (for example NSPA Northern Sparsely
Populated Areas) and ‘research and innovations’ (for example ERRIN European
Regions Research and Innovation Network) (Borras, 1993; Weynand, 1996; Sodupe,
1999). Therefore, we hypothesize that Brussels offices that have many ties with these
associations will generally be more active on re-distributive issues:
Hypothesis 5: The more regional authorities that belong to many trans-regional
associations, the larger the re-distributive policy portfolio of their
regional representation.
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Finally, two other factors are believed to explain the size of a representation’s
regulatory policy portfolio. In order to assess the implications of particular policy
measures, policymakers often rely on information and expertise from societal actors.
The need for input from regional private interests could even be higher in the case of
regulatory policies, given their more specialized and technical nature. Therefore, we
hypothesize that regional offices with ties with private regional interests will have
a larger regulatory policy portfolio. In addition to these networks with private
interests, we expect regional representations that need information on regulatory
matters will exchange information with regions with other countries, rather than
become involved in trans- regional associations (given that the latter are more likely
to focus on re-distributive matters). In sum:
Hypothesis 6: Regional offices that establish contacts with regional societal
interests have a larger regulatory policy portfolio.
Hypothesis 7: Regional offices that have most of their information exchanges with
regional offices from other member-states have a larger regulatory
policy portfolio.
Data and Research Design
An important part of our project consists of the systematic mapping of territorial
representations that are active in Brussels. Here, we relied on data collection
techniques that are becoming increasingly common in research on organized
interests (Berkhout and Lowery, 2007; Halpin and Jordan, 2011), combining
directories published by private organizations with registers created by the
European institutions. We included regions in our sample if they met three criteria,
namely being located at the first level below the central government (1), not being
a de-concentrated administrative unit (2), and having on average a population of
at least 150.000 inhabitants (3) (for details see Donas and Beyers, 2013a). This
resulted in a population of 159 liaison offices and 21 partial national associations
(n= 180), the latter are offices that represent a small number of regions of the same
country.
In a next stage we coded all these regions on the basis of public available data. For
self-rule we rely on the indices Hooghe et al developed (2010), while the dependence
on EU cohesion funds was retrieved from Eurostat data. In order to measure the ties
of regional offices with trans-regional associations, we coded the membership of
68 trans-regional associations (Donas and Beyers, 2013b). These data are combined
with evidence collected through a large telephone survey (conducted in the Fall
of 2011 and Spring of 2012). We started out with contacting 180 regional
representations. In total, we were able to gather data on the policy portfolios of
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127 regional representations, which implies that our dataset covers the population
of Brussels- based regional representations fairly well. Of the other 53 contacted
representations that did not take part in the interviews, only 17 refused to participate
or did not find a suitable time for an interview. Analysis of the non-response shows
that mostly Southern European regions refused to participate, yet we still have
a considerable number of responses for regions in these countries (for instance Spain
n= 14; Italy n= 13). For the other 36 regional representations, we have indications,
through contacts with officials from the same member-state (either other regional
offices or the national Permanent Representation), that these offices were recently
closed down or have substantially decreased their activities, often because of the
recent financial crisis, which depressed the budgets available for a permanent
Brussels-based presence. The largest majority of the respondents were head of office
with an average experience at the organization of about 6 years. During the interview,
we also asked the number of staff the office employed; we consider this as a proxy
for the amount of resources of a regional representation.
In the remainder of this article we analyze the responses to two central questions
we asked in order to map the policy portfolio of these regional representations. The
first question sought to discover the type of policy domains that are monitored by
the regional representation. The list encompassed 18 policy domains (based on the
Comparative Agenda’s Project Codebook, including for instance domains such as
‘agriculture’, ‘education’ and ‘health’) and was formulated as follows:
In the next set of questions I will ask you about the policy domains your office is
active in. This means that you screen on a regular basis upcoming legislation,
exchange information with colleagues and report to your regional govern-
ment. I will now give you a list of 18 policy domains. Could you tell me which
of these are important in the sense that your organization spends a lot of
resources monitoring developments in these domains?
[GO THROUGH A LIST OF DOMAINS]
The next question probed into concrete lobbying practices developed during the past
6 months and was phrased as follows:
● Which are the EU legislative processes your office has been actively seeking
attention for the interests of your region during the past six months? More
concretely, we refer to proposals for directives or regulations submitted by the
Commission, ongoing legislative work that involves the Council and the Parlia-
ment, or Green and White Books.
● Which is the most important one?
During the interview we also collected data on the information exchanges the
regional representations established with public and private actors (Donas and
Beyers, 2013b). One of the questions focused on the other regional representations
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with which the office had exchanged information in the past 6 months and was
phrased as follows:
Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the policy networks you are
involved in. Basically, it concerns the networks through which you share and
exchange policy relevant information with other significant actors. Could you
tell me which are, for your office, the most important Brussels-based regional
representations with whom you had regular contact during the past six
months?
One way to measure the propensity with which an office has exchanges with offices
from other member-states is by using Krackhardt and Stern’s E-I index (1988, pp.
127–128), which expresses the heterophily of actor ties, or more precisely the
propensity of actors to develop contacts outside the group – in this case member-
states – to which they belong. The index measures the extent to which exchanges
external to a particular group (in this case linkages with regional offices from other
member-states) dominate over internal ties (contacts with regional offices from the
same member-state). For each regional office this index is calculated by subtracting
the number of internal ties (with offices from the same member-states) from the
number of external ties (with offices from other member-states), and dividing this
difference by the total number of ties. The index varies between −1 (all exchanges are
with regional offices of the same member-state), 0 (an equal number of internal
and external links) and +1 (all exchanges are with offices originating from other
member-states).
The question concerning contact with private actors was formulated as an open
question, as interviewees were asked who were the most important societal actors –
which could be companies, business associations or citizen groups – with whom they
frequently interacted during the past 6 months. Afterwards, we recoded the responses
into a dummy variable indicating whether or not the office established contacts with
regional societal interests. Unfortunately, short telephone interviews are somewhat
limited in terms of the amount of detailed evidence one can collect and this
admittedly only provides a rather rough measurement. Therefore, we also include
a brief qualitative account of the type of domestic interests it concerns.
Mapping and Explaining Policy Portfolios
First we address the scope of engagement of Brussels-based regional representations.
Here, we distinguish between the monitoring of policy domains and political activity
on specific legislative issues. As we argued earlier, regional interests may have a
rather generalist orientation, as a large and diverse number of policy matters might be
of interest to them. In addition, organized interests face substantial uncertainties in
terms of how the governmental agenda will evolve. This uncertainty stimulates them
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to broadly monitor their environment, rather than limiting their attention to one single
domain (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001, p. 1204; Halpin and Binderkrantz, 2009). In
other words, in order to specialize, some generalist propensity is required. Never-
theless, the actual policy involvement is expected to be more limited, as organiza-
tions face constraints in time and resources, which leads them to focus on a smaller
set of issues.
As demonstrated in Figure 1, a similar observation can be made regarding
Brussels-based regional interests. The horizontal axis plots the number of ‘issues’
and ‘domains’ on which an office is active, while the vertical axis shows the amount
of regional offices that are active on, respectively, issues and domains. As far as the
monitoring of domains is concerned, we note that the scope of attention generally is
quite broad (median and mode= 11; kurtosis= −0.14, skewness= −0.37). Through
the open question about lobbying activities during the past 6 months, we identified
policy processes related to 39 issues in which our respondents developed lobbying
activities. In contrast, the breadth of actual political engagement regarding these
issues is much more limited, as most organizations focused on two legislative issues
(median= 3 and mode= 2, kurtosis= 0.42, skewness= 0.42). In other words, while
regional interest organizations may monitor multiple policy domains, in their
concrete lobbying behavior only a limited number of legislative issues are being
prioritized.
Each issue could be related to a specific Directorate-General of the European
Commission (DG), the DG being the main responsible administrative unit for the
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Figure 1: Issue and domain attention of regional offices (n= 127 regional offices).
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how the monitoring of policy domains and political activity on specific issues varies
across the different DGs. When we consider the total number of regional interests
mobilizing on each issue, we observe a strongly positively skewed distribution.
Whereas the skewness for domain attention and issue attention is, respectively,
−0.75 and 1.70, for the most important issue the skewness is 2.83. This means that
although regional interests specialize at the individual level, at the aggregate level
policy attention is rather concentrated. Figure 2 shows that regional offices spread
their monitoring activities across several DGs. Nonetheless, actual lobbying behavior
varies considerably across these venues. Only in the case of DG Regional Policy
(REGIO), we observe that the great majority of interested regional offices also
engages in lobbying activities (84 per cent). A similar pattern can be discerned for
DG Agriculture (AGRI, 55 per cent). For all the other DGs, a far lower proportion
of the interested regional offices demonstrate actual political engagement.
It is clear that DG REGIO attracts most lobbying, as it is the center of attention for
a considerable number of regional offices. Obviously, it is no surprise that regional
policies are a key concern for regional offices, given their considerably budgetary
implications for many regions. Still, many regions have competences in a wide range
of policy domains. Some regional representations have established a policy portfolio
that goes beyond the crowded lobby scene concentrated around DG REGIO. In order
to assess the varying nature and size of policy portfolios, an analysis on the level
of the particular policy issues is provided. Of these 39 issues, nine referred to DGs
that Broscheid and Coen (2007) coded as re-distributive, the other 30 are under
the auspices of DGs whose overall competence is considered of a more regulatory
nature. Yet, we have to be careful with relying on the DG for measuring the nature of
a policy issue, as also DGs with strong re-distributive responsibilities (for example
agriculture) may initiate regulatory policies (or vice versa). By taking a closer look
at each issue, we coded 24 issues as regulatory and nine as re-distributive.2 Among
the latter, we count the reform of the common agricultural policy and cohesion













Figure 2: Field attention, issue attention and issue importance, DG-level (n= 127 regional offices).
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the Financial Transaction Tax. However, a simple count of the number of distinct
legislative issues provides a wrong impression. Although more regulatory issues
were named, on average a Brussels office is active on 1.8 re-distributive and
0.5 regulatory issues. This means that generally, regional representations are
3.5 times more active on re-distributive issues compared to regulatory ones, which
shows a clear skewness of attention to a limited number of re-distributive issues,
whereas regulatory issues represent a rather particular niche market.
For our analyses we created two count variables for the regulatory and the
re-distributive policy portfolio, each measuring the number of regulatory or dis-
tributive issues that an office prioritized in its lobbying activities. Both indices are
unrelated (r= 0.11, P= 0.2342), which means that they point at different portfolio
types. Representations that lobby extensively on regulatory issues are thus not more
likely to lobby on re-distributive issues, and vice versa. As already mentioned, about
24 issues we identified are regulatory in nature. Whereas these issues are of a concern
to a rather small number of regional representations (on average three offices per
issue), the nine re-distributive issues attract much more attention (on average
29 offices per issue). To summarize, it seems that we can distinguish three groups
of offices, namely a small set whose focus is mostly on monitoring, a large set that is
mainly concerned about re-distributive lobbying and a smaller set that in addition to
re-distributive issues also concentrates on regulative lobbying. The lobbying by
regional representations is thus strongly geared to re-distributive issues, as almost all
regional representations (90 per cent of the interviewed offices) have re-distributive
issues in their portfolio. Regulatory lobbying, in contrast, is conducted by a much
smaller set of actors (38 per cent of the interviewed offices).
In order to gain more insight into these differences, Tables 1 and 2 present various
Poisson regression models predicting the number of re-distributive and regulatory
issues a regional office has in its portfolio. Our main expectations are that the size of
the regulatory and re-distributive policy portfolio will be shaped by the network
embeddedness of a regional office, yet also by its mobilized resources and political-
institutional features, such as the amount of self-rule of the region and its dependence
on EU-funds.
Generally, we have no strong evidence in support of the hypotheses predicting
the size of the re-distributive policy portfolio. Yet, this could be because of the fact
that this dependent variable is characterized by a high level of concentration, as
almost all regional offices have a considerable number of re-distributive policy issues
in their portfolio. Still, one variable seems to be relevant. As expected, the more
membership ties an office has to EU-level trans-regional associations, the more
a policy portfolio consists of distributive issues. None of the other factors – staff-
resources, self-rule, internal orientation or the dependence on EU-funds – is found to
have an impact on this component of the policy portfolio.
It is interesting to contrast these findings with the models predicting the size of the
regulatory portfolio. Although regional offices are highly similar in terms of their
Donas et al
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re-distributive portfolio, some factors, which were expected to positively influence
re-distributive lobbying, have the opposite effect on the size of a region’s regulative
policy portfolio. For instance, the more outward-looking a regional office is – that
is exchanging information with regions originating from other member-states – and
the lower its dependence on EU-funds, the larger the amount of regulatory issues
in its policy portfolio. In addition, while many membership ties with trans-regional
associations result in a larger re-distributive portfolio, it decreases the size of the
regulatory portfolio. All these findings suggest that regions with a large regulatory
portfolio are characterized by a different network position in the Brussels arena.
We also learn that the ties with regionally based interest groups lead to a larger
regulatory policy portfolio. While we were only able to control the presence of such
ties with a dichotomous variable the qualitative evidence from our interviews
confirms this picture. Respondents with a considerable number of regulatory policy
issues in their portfolio were more eager to report on their relations with regional











Intercept 0.559*** 0.425 0.258
(0.11) (0.39) (0.40)
Staff size (log) 0.111 0.104 0.090
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Cohesion funding per capita — 0.016 0.033
(log) — (0.06) (0.06)










E-I index — — −0.224
— — (0.14)
Model fit:
DF 125 123 120
-LL −74.5026 −74.4377 −70.6148
χ2 87.9313 87.5218 86.6596
aSignificance levels are based on model-based standard errors (in parenthesis).
†=< 0.1, * =< 0.05, ** =< 0.01, ***=< 0.001.
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private interests, in particular connections with employer associations and compa-
nies. In some instances, it concerned ties between regional offices and large
multinational corporations that have their headquarter in that particular region.3
Furthermore, also less high-profile connections were reported, such as ties with
harbors and companies in the energy, transport and pharmaceutical sector. Some
regional offices even have integrated this private–public partnership in their
organizational set-up, for instance by having seconded private sector specialists in
their staff or by establishing an advisory board consisting of representatives from the
public and the private sector. Although admittedly these are rudimentary findings,
they correspond with our characterization of regional offices as transmission belts
between three types of actors: the regional government, regionally based interest
groups and the EU institutions.
When considering political-institutional variables, we notice that as expected
more self-rule increases the size of the regulatory policy portfolio, whereas it did











Intercept −1.291*** −0.997 −0.665
(0.25) (0.77) (0.81)
Staff size (log) 0.465*** 0.275† 0.21
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
Cohesion funding per capita (log) — −0.249* −0.290*
— (0.107) (0.12)










E-I index — — 0.483*
— — (0.24)
Model fit:
DF 125 123 120
-LL −104.6365 −100.3163 −94.9161
χ2 154.9725 143.2876 128.7996
aSignificance levels are based on model-based standard errors (in parenthesis).
†=< 0.1, * =< 0.05, ** =< 0.01, ***=< 0.001.
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not have an effect on the amount of re-distributive issues. Our results also show that
the offices representing regional authorities that receive considerable EU cohesion
funding are much less active on regulatory issues. One possible explanation is that in
regions who receive higher levels of cohesion funding (mostly Southern and Eastern
European), civil society is often still young and developing, and consequently less
able to provide relevant input on regulatory matters to its regional office (on this
matter see for instance Börzel, 2010).
Finally, our non-result for the amount of mobilized resources, measured as the staff
size, casts an interesting light on our conceptualization of organizational capabilities.
Although a bivariate model with only this variable would lead us to expect that more
resources lead to a much larger regulatory portfolio (Model 1 Table 2), this effect
disappears when we gradually add other explanatory factors. Moreover, a comparison
of the difference between Models 1 and 3 demonstrates that a model that accounts for
contextual network factors has a much better statistical fit (2(−LL – −LL)=27.17,
Δdf= 5, P= 0.0001) than a model that only accounts for mobilized resources. Accor-
dingly, the staff size itself has no direct implications for an office’s policy portfolio,
when controlled for the network embeddedness of the latter. This has also some
practical implications for regional policymakers who establish regional offices. It means
that more staff will only result into an expanded portfolio if this increase in resources
leads to a better connectedness with other EU level and domestic stakeholders.
Conclusion and Discussion
Whereas much earlier work on EU territorial lobbying focused on the interaction
between regional offices and central state governments, or their relation to the EU
institutions, less attention has been devoted to the policies these regional representa-
tions prioritize. We consider a policy portfolio as a crucial component of an interest
organization’s political activities, which clarifies the type of interests that is
represented. Although regional representations to the EU all fulfill a similar function,
there are considerable differences regarding the number and nature of issues they
prioritize. Moreover, while the jurisdictions that these regional representations
represent frequently have a large and diverse set of interests, most of these offices
rely on limited resources. Therefore, not every domain or issue of interest can be
included in the organization’s portfolio. In this article, we demonstrated that the
Brussels-based regional representations usually monitor developments in various
policy domains. However, their lobbying activities are much more restricted and
generally remain limited to two legislative issues.
From our analyses of these policy portfolios, it appears that three types of regional
representations can be distinguished: a group that primarily focuses on monitoring,
a large group that mainly concentrates on re-distributive issues and a small group that
in addition to these re-distributive matters also engages in lobbying on issues of a
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regulatory nature. If we consider the characteristics of these regional representations,
we observe that only a limited set of regions are likely to engage in regulative
lobbying, more specifically those who enjoy much autonomy and have ties with
regionally based interest groups. Re-distributive lobbying activities appear to be
less strongly linked to these features, and can only be predicted by their connections
to trans-regional associations. Hence, the focus of lobbying by regional representa-
tions considerably depends on structural connections of lobbyists to other public
agencies and private interests.
To conclude, we highlight the broader implications of our findings as well as some
limitations. First, our approach demonstrates that an interest group perspective provides
an adequate framework for analyzing the political practices of regions at the European
level. Second, we need to admit that we cannot draw strong causal conclusions from our
finding. For some factors, for instance resources, one can imagine that they precede
the formation of policy portfolios, but for other factors the causal order is much less
obvious. Yet, by systematically identifying predictive factors, we were able to point at
some social mechanisms and scope conditions that are connected to specific policy
portfolio’s. Finally, confirming other research our findings indicate that lobbying needs
to be conceived as a highly contextualized practice, in which networks play a crucial
role (Braun, 2012; Heaney and Lorenz, 2013; Walker and McCarthy, 2010). Therefore,
the nature of these policy networks in which public and private actors intermingle
needs to be examined in more detail in future research. Considering that the boun-
daries between so-called private and public interests become increasingly blurred (see
Green-Cowles, 2003), the role of regional public and private interests as well as their
interdependencies should be taken into account when analyzing interest group
communities and policymaking processes in the European Union.
Notes
1 Note that we deliberately do not speak about an organizational policy agenda, as we seek to differentiate
attention at the organizational level (portfolio) from the more aggregate policy agenda that is situated at
the level of specific institutional venues (for instance the governmental agenda) or political systems
(such as the EU political agenda).
2 Sometimes legislative proposals might be difficult to classify as regulatory or distributive. In these cases
we coded them as mixed and analyzed them separately. Not a single variable turned out to be significant,
which is in line with our other findings.
3 Owing to the fact that we promised anonymity to our respondents, we are not able to present very
concrete cases including names of offices and/or the companies.
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